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11 Introduction
A Bayesian pure exchange economy is a pure exchange economy in which the
consumers are asymmetrically endowed with information about their prefer-
ence relations and initial endowments. A strategy in a Bayesian pure ex-
change economy is a plan which speciﬁes a net trade for each state.1 We
adopt Harsanyi’s (1967/68) type-proﬁle approach, so a state is deﬁned as
a type proﬁle. A strategy bundle is endogenously determined as a solution
of the game played by the consumers. A strategy bundle is synonymously
called a mechanism, so the theory endogenously determines a mechanism.
After the consumers determine a mechanism, they execute it in the interim
period, that is, each consumer chooses his particular net trade according to
the plan when he knows his own type but not the others’. A solution is called
interim if it is determined in the interim period. It is called ex ante if it is
determined in the ex ante period.
Wilson (1978) initiated analysis of cooperative behavior in a Bayesian
pure exchange economy, and proposed the coarse core and the ﬁne core as
interim solution concepts. He established nonemptiness of the coarse core,
and also provided an example of an economy with an empty ﬁne core.
Subsequent researchers paid particular attention to two basic conditions
that a strategy needs to satisfy, in that the members of a coalition only de-
sign a strategy bundle which satisﬁes these two conditions. One condition,
originally proposed by Radner (1968) in a diﬀerent context, is the informa-
tional feasibility. It is the requirement that each plan be measurable with
respect to the information structure available to the consumer at the time of
his strategy-execution. Yannelis (1991) considered the private information
case deﬁned as the situation in which only the private information structure
will be available to each consumer at the time of strategy-execution. A strat-
egy bundle satisfying the informational feasibility for the private information
case is called private measurable.
Another condition is the requirementthat a strategy bundle be exactly ex-
ecuted according to the agreed upon plan, namely d’Aspremont and G´ erard-
Varet’s (1979) Bayesian incentive compatibility. Ichiishi and Idzik (1996)
introduced this requirement into a generalized core analysis, and deﬁned the
ex ante Bayesian incentive-compatible core as the core in the private infor-
1Some works deﬁne a plan as a function which speciﬁes a consumption bundle for each
state, or as a pair of a net-trade plan and a communication plan, but the present paper
does not consider these strategies.
2mation case in which each possible coalition designs a private measurable
and Bayesian incentive-compatible strategy bundle in the ex ante period.
Our study object in the present paper is the interim analogues of the ex
ante Bayesian incentive-compatible core. We introduce the Bayesian incen-
tive compatibility to Wilson’s coarse core and a variant of his ﬁne core in the
private information case.
Our ﬁrst result is the general nonemptiness theorem for the Bayesian
incentive-compatiblecoarse core. This positive result makes a sharp contrast
to Vohra’s (1999, example 3.2, pp. 136-138) negative result; the latter is
based on the postulate that execution of a coalitional strategy is assisted
and enforced by a mediator, so each strategy can utilize pooled information
despite the fact that consumers do not share their private information. Our
private information case is appropriate in an economy in which no coalition
uses a mediator or shares their private information. We view that in general
there is no mediator in the present-day economy, so the private information
case prevails, unless there is another mechanism built in the economy for
information-transmission or information-sharing.
Wilson (1978) deﬁned the ﬁne core for situations in which the mem-
bers of a coalition can use several communication systems for pooling their
private information. In the absence of a credible communication system,
however, we are left with the private information case, and the interim core
concept which is essentially as ﬁne as Wilson’s ﬁne core concept is natu-
rally deﬁned in this case. This is the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim
core. Vohra (1999, Example 2.1, pp. 131-132) constructed an example of
a market for a single indivisible lemon with money in which the Bayesian
incentive-compatible interim core is empty. By removing the indivisibility
from his example, we see that this negative result may hold true even for
Bayesian pure exchange economies which satisfy all the standard neoclas-
sical assumptions. The Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core may be
empty, because a utility allocation is blocked by a coalition at a particu-
l a rt y p ep r o ﬁ l e( S,tS), and another utility allocation which is stable against
(S,tS) is blocked by a coalition at another type proﬁle (S ,t  S 
). In order
to guarantee the existence of a core strategy bundle, therefore, we need to
explore the eﬀects of diﬀerent type proﬁles on the stability of strategy plans.
The second result of the present paper is to establish a condition on the ef-
fects of diﬀerent type proﬁles under which the Bayesian incentive-compatible
interim core is nonempty. However, the second result is based on the strong
postulate that each consumer’s interim expected utility given his type is
3aﬃne linear. Moreover, the condition for nonemptiness of the interim core
is stringent. Nevertheless, at the cost of these strong assumptions, we have
obtained simplicity of the suﬃcient condition, which oﬀers a clear-cut in-
sight into the relationship among diﬀerent type proﬁles that is needed for
the positive result.
We remark that the present positive results are unlikely to be extended
beyond the pure exchange economy.
For a survey of the works on ex ante cores of a Bayesian pure exchange
economy, see, e.g., Ichiishi and Yamazaki (2002, subsection 3.5).
The next section formulates the model of Bayesian pure exchange econ-
omy, and two descriptive solutions: a Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse
core net-trade plan, and a Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core net-
trade plan. Section 3 presents the main results: the two existence results.
Section 4 discusses several examples in order to gain an insight into some
aspects of our assumption on eﬀects of type proﬁles. Section 5 provides
proofs of all the results. The Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core
concept actually does not take into account the eﬀects of possible revelation
of private-information by the very act of agreeing or disagreeing to a coali-
tional (coordinated) strategy bundle. The last section points out a simple
situation in which such revelation does not aﬀect a consumer’s decision in
regard to joining the coalition.
2M o d e l a n d T w o Interim Core Concepts
We study a pure exchange economy with l commodities and n consumers
in which consumers are asymmetrically endowed with information about
the data of the economy. Let N be the set of n consumers, and let N
(:= 2N \ {∅}) be the family of nonempty coalitions. In accordance with
Harsanyi’s (1967/1968) framework of the Bayesian game, let T j be a ﬁnite
set of consumer j’s types. The type-proﬁle space for each coalition S is then
given as T S :=
 
j∈S T j. Set for simplicity, T := T N.A m e m b e r o f T is
synonymously called a type proﬁle or a state. The interim period is deﬁned
here as the period during which each consumer j knows his true type tj ∈ T j
but not the others’. His private information structure, denoted by T j,i st h e
algebra on T generated by the sets, {tj}×T N\{j}, tj ∈ T j.
Given type proﬁle t, each consumer is characterized by his consump-
tion set R
l
+, his state-dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
4uj(·,t):Rl
+ → R, his initial endowment vector ej(tj) ∈ Rl
+, and his interim
probability πj(·|tj)o nT given tj. We are assuming here that the initial
endowment function ej depends only on tj, in other words, ej (when viewed
as a function on T)i sT j-measurable. If the consumers commonly hold an
objective ex ante probability π on T,c o n s u m e rj’s interim probability is
given by the Bayes’ rule,
π







π(¯ tj,sN\{j}), if tj = ¯ tj,
0, otherwise,
but our present framework allows for subjectiveprobabilities, and even incon-
sistency among interim probabilities (in that there is no ex ante probability
to which the Bayes’ rule can be applied in order to derive the interim prob-
abilities).









is an economy with l commodities, where N i sac o n s u m e rs e t ,a n df o re a c h
consumer j, T j is his type set, Rl
+ is his consumption set, uj : Rl
+ ×T → R
is his type-proﬁle-dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, ej :
T → Rl
+ is his initial endowment function, postulated to be T j-measurable,
and πj(·|tj)i sh i sinterim probability on the states T given tj.
We analyze consumers’ cooperative behavior during the interim period.
When type proﬁle t prevails, consumer j chooses his net trade vector zj(t)
(∈ Rl). Any set S of consumers can come together and jointly schedule a
net-trade plan zS := {zj}j∈S, so that the plan is individually feasible,







∀ t ∈ T :
 
j∈S
zj(t) ≤ 0. (2)
5Consumer j’s net-trade plan zj : T → Rl is his strategy.2 Denote by F S the
set of all feasible strategy bundles for coalition S:
F
S := {z
S : T → R
l·#S | z
S satisﬁes (1) and (2)}.
Not all plans in F S can actually be chosen. We discuss two basic con-
ditions that a plan has to satisfy. We are studying consumers’ behavior in
(what the literature has called) the private information case, that is the pri-
vate information structure T j is the information structure available to j at
t h et i m eo fj’s action (choice of net trade). The ﬁrst condition, therefore,
stipulates that a plan be informationally feasible in this case; to be precise,
∀ j ∈ S : zj is T j-measurable. (3)
Ap l a nzS satisfying condition (3) is called private measurable.D e n o t e b y
F  S the set of all feasible, private-measurable strategy bundles for coalition
S:
F




The second condition pertains to the feasibility of execution of strategy
bundles viewed as “contracts” made within a coalition. Suppose that the
members of coalition S agree to take a strategy bundle zS ∈ F  S.L e t¯ tj be
consumer j’s true type. If he makes a choice according to the agreement, his


















j(t | ¯ t
j).
In the private information case, however, he can make any choice cj ∈
zj(T j)\{zj(¯ tj)} contrary to the agreement, yet his colleagues S \{j} cannot
catch this betraying act, being led to believe that j’ st r u et y p ew e r ei nt h e
event (zj)
−1 (cj). If j makes such a choice, his interim expected utility given

















j(t | ¯ t
j).
The members of the coalition decide on plan zS, in order to realize the
choice bundle zS(t) at each possible type proﬁle t.I fm e m b e rj does not act
2It is important that j’s strategy is his net-trade plan zj. Some models postulate that
j’s strategy is his consumption plan, t  → zj(t)+ej(tj), but we cannot obtain the existence
results (the main results of this paper) with this alternative deﬁnition of strategy.
6according to the agreed plan, taking advantage of his private information, the
required outcome zS(¯ t) cannot be achieved and the purpose of the coalition
formation is not fulﬁlled. To guarantee realization of the exact execution
of an agreement, the members of the coalition agree only to those plans
zS which nobody has an incentive to act contrary to. In short, they agree
only to the Bayesian incentive-compatible plans. To be precise, the Bayesian




j : Euj(zj + ej | tj) ≥ Euj(zj(˜ tj)+ej | tj). (4)
Notice that unlike Vohra (1999), there is no mediator in our model, since
we are modelling the reality in which the members of a coalition seldom
consult with an outsider (mediator) in carrying out their own agreement.





 S | z
S satisﬁes (4)}.
We remark that 0 ∈ ˆ F S, in particular each set ˆ F S is nonempty.
The consumers play a cooperative game during the interim period. A
descriptive solution of the game is a feasible and coalitionally stable strategy
bundle z∗. Here, the feasibility means that z∗ ∈ ˆ F N. By making precise the
coalitional stability condition in two diﬀerent ways, we obtain two versions
of the interim core concept. The ﬁrst (deﬁnition 2.2) is a variant of Wilson’s
(1978) coarse core concept, modiﬁed so that it becomes appropriate in the
private information case.
DEFINITION 2.2 A Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core net-trade
plan of a Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe is a strategy bundle z∗ such
that
(i) z
∗ ∈ ˆ F
N;a n d
(ii) it is not true that
∃ S ∈N: ∃ z
S ∈ ˆ F














7The members of ∧j∈ST j are the events that all consumers in S can discern
without exchange of their private information. Defecting coalition S forms
at a commonly discernable event E, if there exists a private measurable and
Bayesian incentive-compatible strategy bundle zS with which every member







T i if S = {i},
{∅,T} if #S ≥ 2.
The notion of interim-utility improvement in deﬁnition 2.2 (ii) might be
too strong, making the core concept too weak, since it requires improvement
even at states which some agents, according to their private information,
know do not prevail. However, this deﬁnition has the merit that it enables
us to avoid all complicated issues related to the information-revelation caused
merely by agents’ decision to join the coalition. Member j would reveal the
information that his type is not tj merely by deciding to join the coalition
and agreeing to the defecting strategy zS, if his conditional expected utility
of zj +ej given tj were lower than his conditional expected utility of z∗j +ej
given tj. In the context of deﬁnition 2.2 (ii), private information cannot
be revealed in this way, because in the mutually discernible event E,e a c h
individual knows that everyone improves upon the contract z∗ at all states.
We will come back to this point in section 6 where we discuss information-
revelation through coalition formation in a speciﬁc case.
The second concept (deﬁnition 2.3) may be considered a version of Wil-
son’s (1978) ﬁne core concept, but the two are substantially diﬀerent: While
Wilson’s ﬁne core allows a blocking coalition to use an admissible communi-
cation system (in short, the members of a coalition can opt to partially pool
their private information), we are interested in the private information case
in the absence of a mechanism for credible pooling and of a mediator. In our
case, therefore, a core plan z∗ remains private measurable. We retain the
strong coalitional stability condition of the ﬁne core that no coalition at any
p o s s i b l et y p ep r o ﬁ l ec a ni m p r o v eu p o nz∗.
DEFINITION 2.3 A Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core net-trade
plan of a Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe is a strategy bundle z∗ such
that
8(i) z
∗ ∈ ˆ F
N;a n d
(ii) it is not true that
∃ S ∈N: ∃ z
S ∈ ˆ F
S :









There are two aspects of the present deﬁnition of the ﬁne core that dis-
tinguish it from Wilson’s ﬁne core. The ﬁrst aspect is that although this
deﬁnition may be considered a version of Wilson’s ﬁne core, it does not as-
sume communication among agents for pooling information. This is why the
private measurability is imposed. The nature of ﬁneness comes from the re-
quirement of a strong coalitional stability as opposed to a weaker stability
requirement of the coarse core. The second aspect is that instead of restrict-
ing objections to a “commonly discernible” event among the members of the
coalition, we impose incentive compatibility.
3R e s u l t s
We ﬁrst present a positive existenceresult on the Bayesian incentive-compatible
coarse core net-trade plan. A function f : Rl
+ → R is called weakly mono-
tone, if
[c,c
  ∈ R
l
+,c ≤ c
 ] ⇒ f(c) ≤ f(c
 ).
PROPOSITION 3.1 Let Epe be a Bayesian pure exchange economy. As-
sume for each consumer j that his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
uj(·,t) is continuous, concave, and weakly monotone in Rl
+ for every t ∈ T.
Then there exists a Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core net-trade plan.
REMARK 3.2 In our proof of proposition 3.1 (section 5), we show the
existence of an interim Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core net-trade




∗j(t)=0, for every t ∈ T,
9while allowing for the broad range of strategies (the weak inequality (2)) for
all possible blocking coalitions.
REMARK 3.3 Vohra’s example of an empty Bayesian incentive-compatible
coarse core (Vohra, 1999, example 3.2, pp. 136-138) is crucially based on his
postulate that for a plan zS of coalition S, each strategy zj is a function of
tS ∈ T S, rather than of tj ∈ T j. Vohra’s setup requires the presence of a
mediator who, by collecting private information, enlarges the set of possible
blocking strategies, thereby making coalition-formation easier.
We turn to the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core. It is easy
to establish that when l =1 , the zero net-trade plan t  → 0 (resulting in
the initial endowment function t  →{ ej(tj)}j∈N as the ﬁnal allocation plan)
is the unique Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core plan of a Bayesian
pure exchange economy. Indeed, by the individual rationality, a core plan
has to yield at least an interim utility allocation {Euj(ej | tj)}j∈N for each
type proﬁle t. But no coalition S at any type proﬁle tS can improve upon
this, since if a member can improve at tS then at least one other member
will be worse oﬀ at tS in the light of the fact that there is no give and take
in the case l =1 .
For l ≥ 2, the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core may be empty,
even for a Bayesian pure exchange economy satisfying all the neoclassical
convexityassumptions and linearity of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions. This negative result makes a contrast to nonemptiness of the
Bayesian incentive-compatibleex ante core (see, e.g., Ichiishiand Idzik(1996)
for the role of linearity of the utility functions in dealing with Bayesian
incentive compatibility). Vohra (1999, Example 2.1, pp. 131-132) showed
this negative result in his example of a market for a single indivisible lemon.
The following example is a minor variant of Vohra’s example, obtained by
removing the indivisibility.
EXAMPLE 3.4 Consider the followingtwo-consumer, two-commodity Bayes-





10The type-proﬁle space T := T 1 × T 2 is identiﬁed with T 1.C o n s u m e r 1 i s
the seller of divisible commodity 1, and consumer 2 is the buyer. The seller
knows the quality of commodity 1, but the buyer does not. The second
commodity is money. The consumption set for each consumer is R2
+.T h e
initial endowment function on T is a constant function,













We formulate the quality of commodity 1 in terms of the state-dependent
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. In state l, commodity 1 is of
low quality, giving rise to no utility. In state h, commodity 1 is of high




c2 if t = l




c2 if t = l
15c1 + c2 if t = h.










Then, this economy has no Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core net-
trade plan. Section 5 will provide a proof of this nonexistence result.
REMARK 3.5 succinctly be captured by the following observation. The





0 if t = l























6 if t = l





The no-trade utility allocation is blocked by N at t = l via z,a n dt h e
utility allocation of z is blocked by {1} at t = h via the no-trade.
Remark 3.5 suggests the fact that a Bayesian incentive-compatibleinterim
core strategy bundle may not exist, because a utility allocation is blocked by
a coalition at a particular type proﬁle (S,tS), and another utility allocation
which is stable against (S,tS) is blocked by a coalition at another type pro-
ﬁle (S ,t  S ). In order to guarantee the existence of a core strategy bundle,
therefore, we need to explore the eﬀects of diﬀerent type proﬁles. The rest
of this section will explore conditions among eﬀects of diﬀerent type proﬁles
under which a core strategy bundle does exist.
For a clear-cut result, we will postulate that von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions are aﬃne linear (assumption 3.6). In the following, com-
modity bundles cj + ej(tj) are understood as l-dimensional column vectors.
ASSUMPTION 3.6 (Risk Neutrality) For each consumer j and each





















j), for all c
j.
Here, aj(tj) is the vector of marginal (interim) utilities given type tj,
postulated to be nonnegative. For each coalition S, deﬁne the coalitionally































   
 









h := min {e
j
h(tj) | tj ∈ T j}, in short, ej := inftj∈T j ej(tj). The set CS
0
is nonempty; indeed, 0 ∈ CS
0 .
An agent of economy Epe is deﬁned as a consumer together with his type,
(j,tj); denote by A the set of all agents,
A := {(j,t
j) | j ∈ N,t
j ∈ T
j}.
An admissible blocking coalition is a coalition of agents in which at most
one agent represents each consumer; denote by B0 the family of all admissible
blocking coalitions,
B0 := {B ⊂ A | [(i,t
i),(j,t
j) ∈ B,t
i  = t
j] ⇒ i  = j}.
Thus, consumer-coalition S forms as a blocking coalition in Epe at type proﬁle
¯ tS, iﬀ the admissible agent-coalition B := {(j,¯ tj) ∈ A | j ∈ S} forms. For
B ∈B 0,l e tS(B) be the set of those consumers represented by the agents B,




Also, let tj(B) be the consumer j’s type for which (j,tj(B)) ∈ B.
In the light of the linearity assumption (assumption 3.6), we may deﬁne
the maximal coalitional gain for each B ∈B 0,


















∀ j ∈ S(B):aj(tj(B))cj ≥ 0
 
.
It is achieved with net trades within S(B) that are individually feasible
(cj + ej ≥ 0), coalitionally attainable (
 
j∈S(B)cj ≤ 0), and individually
rational (aj(tj(B))cj ≥ 0). The concept of maximal coalitional gain v(B)
assumes transfer of utilities among the players, but these numerical values
are needed only in a quantitative condition (assumption 3.7) of the existence
theorem (theorem 3.8). Notice that the gain v(B) depends upon {ej}j∈S(B).
We will discuss assumption 3.7 after presentation of theorem 3.8.
ASSUMPTION 3.7 (Possibility of Utility Enhancing Multilateral
Trades) For all {λB}B∈B0 (⊂ R+)a n da l l{µj}j∈N (⊂ Rl
+)f o rw h i c h
∀ i,j ∈ N :
 
B∈B0:S(B) i
λBai(ti(B)) + µi =
 
B∈B0:S(B) j










THEOREM 3.8 economy which satisﬁes assumptions 3.6 and 3.7. Then a
Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core net-trade plan of Epe exists.
To clarify the meaning of assumption 3.7, consider for example the econ-
omy Epe with two consumers (N = {1,2}). If v(B) = 0 for all B ∈B 0,
then the assumption is automatically satisﬁed, so the Bayesian incentive-
compatible interim core is nonempty. Otherwise, for each consumer j,l e t























If there exists nonzero {λB}B∈B0 which gives rise to a member in K1∩K2,
then together with µj = 0 for all j ∈ N, it satisﬁes constraint (5). So the
required inequality (6) is not satisﬁed unless v(B) = 0 for all B ∈B 0,a n d
theorem 3.8 cannot be applied.
If K1 ∩ K2 = {0}, then for any nontrivial λB’s and µj’s to satisfy (5),
some µj must be nonzero, and if the corresponding ej is large, the required
inequality(6) is satisﬁed, and the Bayesian incentive-compatibleinterim core
is nonempty.










The vector ν is independent of j in view of (5). Suppose that the society
values each agent-coalition B as λB, and each commodity h as νh. Then,
by holding a unit of the hth initial endowment, consumer j enjoys two at-





h(tj(B)), and the other is its excess value as an
asset, µ
j




h(tj(B)). Assumption 3.7 says that in this
situation, the society’s maximal utility gain, re-scaled in order to take into
account the value of each coalition,
 
B∈B0 λBv(B), is achieved by the total
excess value of the initial endowments,
 
j∈N µjej.
144E x a m p l e s
In this section, we will re-investigate the example of the single lemon market
(example 3.4) in the light of the existence theorem 3.8, and then study several
further examples that are obtained by modifying the single lemon market
example.
EXAMPLE 4.1 The same example of the single divisible lemon market as








so K2 ⊂ K1, and assumption 3.7 is violated. See ﬁgure 1. This partially
explains nonexistence of the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core net-
trade plan in this example.
To facilitate the discussions in the following examples 4.2 – 4.6, we will
see more closely how assumption 3.7 is violated here. For simplicity, set
(N,l): ={(1,l),(2,t 2)}∈B 0,a n d( N,h): ={(1,h),(2,t 2)}∈B 0. In general,
v(B) = 0 for all B ∈B 0 for which #S(B) = 1. So, in considering λB’s
and µj’s satisfying condition (5), we may assume λB =0f o ra l lB for which
#S(B) = 1. By homogeneity, we may also set λ := λ(N,l), and assume that








2 =1 + µ
2
2.
On the other hand,
v(B)=
 
7.5i f B =( N,l)
0i f B =( N,h)
(the maximal gain v((N,l)) is achieved by the net trades, c1 =( −1,0), c2 =
−c1, which are individually feasible, coalitionally attainable and individually











EXAMPLE 4.2 We look at variants of the one-informed-consumer, one-
uninformed-consumer example (example 3.4). There are two commodities
(l = 2). We specify N, T,a n du1 as in example 3.4, but consider diﬀerent
data on Eu2 : R2
+ → R (still assumed to be aﬃne linear, so that Eu2(c)=





+, j ∈ N.
As in example 4.1 we deﬁne for simplicity, (N,l): ={(1,l),(2,t 2)},a n d
(N,h): ={(1,h),(2,t 2)}. Also as in example 4.1, in considering λB’s and
µj’s satisfying condition (5), we may assume λB =0f o ra l lB for which
#S(B) = 1, and may set λ := λ(N,l),a n dλ(N,h) =1− λ.
Case 1. Suppose a2(t2)=( α,1), for some α>10. See ﬁgure 2. Then,
K1  
K2 = {0}.I f1 0 e1
1 ≤ e2




1 for B =( N,l),
(α − 10)e1
1 for B =( N,h)
(both maximal gains v(B), B =( N,l),(N,h), can be achieved by the indi-
vidually feasible, coalitionally attainable and individually rational net trades
c1 =( −e1
1,10e1
1), c2 = −c1). Coeﬃcients λ and µj’s satisfy (5), iﬀ
(1 − λ)10 + µ
1





2 =1 + µ
2
2.
The required inequality (6) becomes
λαe
1



















But by (5), the left-hand side is equal to −µ2
1e1












2 < (α − 10)e1
1 for B =( N,h),
so given (5), the required condition is a fortiori satisﬁed.
Thus, assumption 3.7 is satisﬁed for arbitrary initial endowment vectors,
e1, e2.
Case 2. Suppose a2(t2)=( 1 5 ,0). (One can easily draw ﬁgures analogous
to ﬁgure 1 for the present case 2 and for the subsequent examples.) Then,
K1  







2, for B =( N,l),
5e1
1 + e2
2, for B =( N,h)
(both maximal gains can be achieved by the individually feasible, coalition-
ally attainable and individually rational net trades c1 =( −e1
1,e 2
2), c2 = −c1).
Coeﬃcients λ and µj’s satisfy (5), iﬀ
(1 − λ)10 + µ
1







































































2, for B =( N,h),
so given (5), the required condition is a fortiori satisﬁed.
17Thus, assumption 3.7 is satisﬁed for arbitrary initial endowment vectors,
e1, e2.
Case 3. Suppose a2(t2)=( 7 .5,0). Then, K1  





2, if B =( N,l),
e2
2, if B =( N,h)
(the second identity is due to the individual rationality of consumer 2). Co-
eﬃcients λ and µj’s satisfy (5), iﬀ


























On the one hand, condition (6) is satisﬁed, if e1
1 = 0. On the other hand, if
e1
1 > 0, condition (6) is violated by λ =0 .25, µ1 = 0 and µ2 =( 0 ,1). Thus,
assumption 3.7 is satisﬁed, iﬀ e1
1 = 0, that is, iﬀ consumer 1 does not initially
possess commodity 1.
EXAMPLE 4.3 This is another variant of the one-informed consumer, one-
uniformed consumer example (example 3.4). We introduce the third com-
modity which is also a lemon,3 but its quality has the reverse contingency,
that is, the quality is high if t = l, and is low if t = h.T h u s ,t h et w ol e m o n s
(commodities 1 and 3) might kill their destabilizing eﬀects each other. We
will see, however, that assumption 3.7 is still violated. This means that the
destabilizing eﬀect of the very asymmetry in information is robust.





3In general, if there are more than two possible lemons, the type space needs to be
expanded to take into account the quality of the second lemon/peach. Actually, due to
the perfect (negative) correlation, we do not have to expand the dimension in the present
formulation.




























where 0 <a<10 and 0 <b<10. We will show that this economy does not
satisfy assumption 3.7.
Deﬁne (N,l)a n d( N,h) as in example 4.1. Also as in example 4.1, in
considering λB’s and µj’s satisfying condition (5), we may assume λB =0




a, if B =( N,l),
b, if B =( N,h)
(the maximal gain v((N,l)) is achievedby the net trades, c1 =( −1,0,0), c2 =
−c1, which are individually feasible, coalitionally attainable and individually
rational, and v((N,h)) is achieved by the net trades, c1 =( 0 ,0,−1), c2 =
−c1).
Condition (5) becomes:
(1 − λ)10 + µ
1










3 = b + µ
2
3.
(Compare with the equivalent condition to (5) in example 4.1; the ﬁrst of the
above three equations corresponds to the fact that commodity 1 is a lemon,
and the third equation corresponds to the fact that commodity 3 is a lemon.)
The requirement (condition (6)) becomes:







which, in the light of (5), is equivalent to:







19We will ﬁrst show that 10 <a+ b, if (6) is to be valid for all (λ,µ1,µ 2)
satisfying (5). Indeed, if 10 ≥ a + b, then there exists λ satisfying





2 =0 ,a n dµ2
1 := (1−λ)10−a ≥ 0, µ2
3 := λ10−b ≥ 0. These
λ, µ1, µ2 satisfy condition (5). But (6) becomes
λa +( 1− λ)b ≤ 0,
which cannot be true.
It suﬃces to show also that 10 >a +b, if (6) is to be valid for all (λ,µ1,µ 2)
satisfying (5). Indeed, if 10 ≤ a + b, then there exists λ satisfying





2 =0 ,a n dµ1
1 := a−(1−λ)10 ≥ 0, µ1
3 := b−λ10 ≥ 0. These
λ, µ1, µ2 satisfy condition (5). But (6) becomes
10 ≤ λa +( 1− λ)b,
which cannot be true.
In addition to the negative result on the single lemon market example,
we have obtained a partially negative result (case 3 of example 4.2) and a
totally negative result (example 4.3). We turn to positive examples 4.4 – 4.6
now. We will show in example 4.4 that a slight modiﬁcation of the previous
examples (case 3 of example 4.2, and example 4.3) guarantees assumption
3.7. Examples 4.5 and 4.6 are modiﬁed cases 1 and 2 of example 4.2, and are
included here for completeness.
EXAMPLE 4.4 We turn to case 3 of example 4.2 and to example 4.3,
both of which either had no endowment of the ﬁrst commodity (lemon) by
a potential seller (i.e., e1
1 = 0) or did not satisfy assumption 3.7 of our
theorem. It is worthwhile to see what kind of perturbation is needed to
change those examples into ones that satisfy the assumption of the theorem
while requiring e1
1 > 0. The common element in both of these examples is
20that the uninformed consumer does not give absolutely higher evaluation of
a potential lemon than the informed consumer in high quality state in terms
of their conditional expected utilities. Thus, it would be very interesting to
check whether our assumption can still be satisﬁed under these circumstances
in a variant of the single lemon model.
In case 3 of example 4.2 the second commodity is no longer a “money”
but a commodity that gives possibly diﬀerent degrees of marginal utilities to
consumers. It seems immediately clear to us that one of the key factors in
this example is that consumer 2 who is a potential “buyer” in the lemon’s
model must have at least relatively higher conditional marginal utility for
a potential lemon than consumer 1 who is a potential “seller.” We simply
modify the example in case 3 as follows: The initial endowment function on
T is a constant function,


















1 > 0a n de
2
2 > 0 .
Let 4
a
1(l)=( 0 ,β l) ,
a





0 <α<α h ,







The remaining speciﬁcation and notation are as in example 4.2. Then,
K1  







































12 denotes the consumer j’s marginal rate of substitution of commodity 2 for
commodity 1.
21Coeﬃcients λ and µj’s satisfy (5), iﬀ
(1 − λ)αh + µ
1
1 = α + µ
2
1,
λβl +( 1− λ)βh + µ
1
2 = β + µ
2
2.
The required inequality (6) becomes
 α
β


































































[α − (1 − λ)αh]+Res(µ) ,
which need not be satisﬁed for values of 0 ≤ λ<1 − (α/αh).





2, then condition (6) becomes:












which is satisﬁed for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1a n da n yµ
j
i ≥ 0.








2. This means that assumption 3.7 is satisﬁed when there are
suﬃciently many units of commodity 2 (in the hand of potential buyer of
the potential lemon) so that the buyer has enough to compensate the seller
for his transfer of the initial endowment of the lemon to the buyer in state
(h,t2).
At ﬁrst glance it might seem that the interim core is empty in case of
example 4.6 as the expected conditional marginal utility α of the buyer for a
22potential lemon is strictly less than the expected conditional marginal utility
αh of the seller when it is not a lemon but a peach. Nonetheless, assumption
3.7 is satisﬁed and the interim core is nonempty. There are two key elements
in example 4.6.
(a) Despite the lower expected conditional marginal utility of the buyer
for a potential lemon, there is another commodity 2, his expected con-
ditional marginal rate of substitution of which for a potential lemon
is kept higher than the expected conditional marginal rate of substi-
tution of the seller so that there is no reversal of the superiority of
the expected conditional marginal rate of substitution for a potential
lemon depending upon type proﬁles.
(b) There must be enough initial endowment of the commodity, in the
hands of the buyer, that is used to compensate the seller for his transfer
of his potential lemon.
Case 3 of example 4.2 did not satisfy (a). Example 4.3 did satisfy (a) but
did not satisfy (b).
EXAMPLE 4.5 We modify case 1 of the previous example 4.2. Intuitively,
what is “wrong” about example 4.1 is that the uninformed consumer does
not posses a commodity which the informed consumer badly wishes to have
so that there is a very proﬁtable trade between the two. Thus, we introduce
a third commodity which “enhances” the utility of the informed consumer
without aﬀecting that of the uninformed consumer. The consumption set for
each consumer is R3
+. The initial endowment function on T is a constant
function,

























1(l)=( 0 ,1,β l),
a














v((N,h)) = −10 + βhe
2
3 + α.
Coeﬃcients λ and µj’s satisfy (5), iﬀ
λ(0,1,β l)+( 1− λ)(10,1,β h)+µ
1 =( α,1,0) + µ
2.










Thus, assumption 3.7 is always satisﬁed. Note that e1
1 = 1 so that the in-
formed consumer has a single potential lemon as in examples 3.4 and 4.1,
and still assumption 3.7 is satisﬁed. The speciﬁc circumstance in this exam-
ple that contributes to fulﬁllment of assumption 3.7 is that there is a third
commodity which highly enhances the utility of the informed consumer if
it is provided to him in exchange for the single potential lemon whose con-
sumption in turn by the uninformed consumer highly enhances his utility.
EXAMPLE 4.6 We turn to case 2 of example 4.2. Noting that in example
4.5 the second commodity “money” does not play any role in guaranteeing
the fulﬁllment of the condition, a crucial aspect is to have a commodity like
the third one in the example. Thus, we modify case 2 so as to have a more
general setting than the previous one with the second commodity eliminated.
Thus, the consumption set for each consumer is R2
+. The initial endowment
function on T is a constant function,







































0 < max {αl,α h} <α ,




βl <MR S 1h
12 =
αh




The remaining speciﬁcation and notation are as in example 4.2. Then,
K1  








































Coeﬃcients λ and µj’s satisfy (5), iﬀ
λ(αl,β l)+( 1− λ)(αh,β h)+µ
1 =( α,β)+µ
2.
The required inequality (6) becomes































The inequality is always satisﬁed. Therefore, assumption 3.7 is satisﬁed for







2. The speciﬁc circumstance in
this example that contributes to fulﬁllment of the condition is essentially the
same as in the previous example.
255P r o o f s
Our proofs of proposition 3.1 and theorem 3.8 are based on the following
two simple observations on strategies in the Bayesian pure exchange econ-
omy (lemmas 5.1 and 5.2). The former is due to Hahn and Yannelis (1997,
proposition 6.10, p. 401), and the latter is due to Ichiishi and Radner (1999,
lemma 6.3, p. 330).
LEMMA 5.1 Let z : T → Rl·#N be a private measurable net-trade plan in
a Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe, such that for each t ∈ T, the total
net trade is exactly equal to 0,
 
j∈N zj(tj)=0. Then, each plan zj is a
constant function, hence is Bayesian incentive-compatible.
LEMMA 5.2 Let zS,fS : T S → Rl·#S be private measurable functions in





for every tS ∈ T S. Then, there exists a private measurable function z∗S :




j∈S fj(tj) for every
tS ∈ T S.
In the light of lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, we can restrict our attention to con-
stant net-trade plans such that for each type proﬁle the total net trade is
exactly equal to 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The proof is the same as Wilson’s (1978, p.
814) proof of nonemptiness of his coarse core. The only diﬀerence is that in
our setup, we only use private-measurable net-trade plans as strategies.
Indeed, given S ∈Nand E ∈
 








[{j}×T j]i f# S ≥ 2,
{j}×Ej if S = {j}
(here, E = T if #S ≥ 2, and E = Ej ×T N\{j}, Ej ∈Tj,i fS = {j}). Deﬁne










∃ zS ∈ F  S : ∀ (j,tj) ∈ (S,E):
u(j,tj) ≤ Euj(zj + ej | tj)
 
.
26Then the non-side-payment game V is balanced, so by Scarf’s (1967) theo-
rem, there exists a private-measurable net-trade plan z  which gives rise a
coarse core utility allocation.
By lemma 5.2 there exists a private-measurable net-trade plan z∗ such
that z  ≤ z∗ and that
 
j∈N z∗(t)=0 for every t ∈ T. By lemma 5.1
the plan z∗ is Bayesian incentive-compatible. By the weak monotonicity of
each Euj(·|tj), z∗ is the required Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core
net-trade plan.
Proof of Emptiness of the Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Interim Core
in Example 3.4. By abuse of notation, when we have a constant plan zj,
we also use the notation zj for the image of the function. The same abuse of







2 if t = l
10(1 + z1
1)+z1
2 if t = h.









Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 guarantee that we can consider only constant plans.












and consumer 2’s strategy is given by z2 = −z1.
We consider the individual rationality, viz., the conditions on a constant
strategy bundle z ∈ F  N for no singleton coalition to interim block. Coalition
{1} cannot block at t = l,i ﬀ
z
1
2 ≥ 0. (7)





2 ≥ 10. (8)





2 + w ≥ w. (9)
The only z1 which satisﬁes (7), (8) and (9) is the no-trade: z∗1 = 0.T h i si s ,
therefore, the only possible interim core strategy.
We will show that the no-trade z∗1 is blocked by N at t = l, which will
complete the proof that this speciﬁc model has an empty core. (The no-trade
cannot be blocked by N at t = h, but this fact is immaterial.) Let z ∈ F  N






2 + w>w . (10)
Consumer 1 agrees to the blocking at t = l,i ﬀ
z
1
2 > 0. (11)
Both agree to the blocking at t = l iﬀ (10) and (11) are satisﬁed. There are








We turn to the proof of theorem 3.8. We actually establish conditions
for the existence of a Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core net-trade
plan that is stronger than the one given in deﬁnition 2.3, in that it is stable
even against a defecting coalition within which (interim) utilities are freely
transferred.
Proof of Theorem 3.8 A constant strategy bundle t  → c∗ is feasible in
the grand coalition (satisﬁes condition (i) of deﬁnition 2.3), if







∗i ≥ 0. (13)
(Recall ej := inftj∈T j ej(tj).) It is coalitionally stable (satisﬁes condition (ii)
of deﬁnition 2.3), if






∗j ≥ v(B). (14)




,t  → c∗ is the required Bayesian incentive-
compatible interim core net-trade plan, if c∗ satisﬁes the above linear in-
equality system (12)–(14). By a version5 of the Minkowsk-Farkas lemma, we
can obtain a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of such c∗.
In the following, λ := {λB}B∈B0, µ := {µj}j∈N,a n dν are #B0-dimensional,
(#N)l-dimensional, and l-dimensional row vectors, respectively (each µj is
a l-dimensional subvector). The linear inequality system (12)–(14) has a
solution, iﬀ
 




















By eliminating ν, and by observing that aj(tj(B)), λB and µj are nonnega-
tive, we obtain the condition of theorem 3.6.
6 Information-Revelation through Coalition
Formation
Consumer j’s very act of joining a coalition may reveal (a part of) his private
information, so condition (ii) of deﬁnition 2.3 (coalitional stability condition
for a Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core net-trade plan) may be
inappropriate. This observation has been known among the researchers of
the present research area as a folklore (see, e.g., Ichiishi and Yamazaki (2002,
subsection 3.2.2)).
The following proposition clariﬁes a rather speciﬁc case in which such
information revelation does not inﬂuence the consumers’ ﬁnal decision on
coalition formation; essentially, it is the situation in which information on
the other consumers’ types T S\{j} is irrelevant to j’s interim expected utility.
5We use the following version: Let A be an m×n matrix, and let b be a m×1m a t r i x .
Then, there exists x ∈ Rn such that Ax ≥ b, iﬀ for every 1 × m matrix λ ≥ 0 for which
λA = 0 it follows that λb ≤ 0.
29PROPOSITION 6.1 Tj-measurability of j’s strategies. Assume also the
no-externality, that is, uj depends only on (cj,t j) ∈ Rl
+ × T j. Then, revela-
tion of information on T S\{j} does not aﬀect j’s decision in regard to joining
coalition S.












Suppose that willingness of the members S \{ j} to choose zS reveals infor-












So, consumer j’s decision in regard to whether or not to accept zS instead of
any other plan z†S does not change after obtaining information A.
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Figure 2: Example 4.2, Case 1. a2(t2)=( α,1), α>10
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